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The Local Role in Homeland Security
David Thacher
There has been considerable discussion since September 11 of the enormous
resource that local police potentially represent in the fight against terrorism.
This article identifies limits to the local role in homeland security by analyzing
a case study of Dearborn, Michigan. Partly because Dearborn is home to one
of the largest concentrations of Arabs in the United States, its experience with
homeland security highlights two kinds of burdens that cities incur when they
engage in proactive surveillance to identify potential terrorists: damage to
their reputation (since police surveillance implies that its objects are not
trustworthy) and damage to police legitimacy (since new surveillance may
undermine trust between police and the community). Because the benefits of
efforts to identify terrorists typically accrue to jurisdictions other than the one
that engages in itFunlike street crime, terrorism is a national or even inter-
national problemFlocal governments have little reason to pursue it. Instead,
cities such as Dearborn have reason to emphasize what I call the ‘‘community
protection’’ aspects of homeland security, such as target hardening and emer-
gency response. This finding has more general implications for our under-
standing of the police role and the politics of policing, showing how both
are shaped by the structural location police occupy in federalist systems of
government.
In the face of a national problem such as homeland security, the
most striking feature of American policing is its decentralization:
the overwhelming majority of U.S. police are distributed across
nearly 13,000 autonomous local police departments. As many par-
ticipants in the debate about homeland security have observed,
there are more than 600,000 local police but only 12,000 FBI
agents, and from this fact they conclude that the nation will max-
imize its ability to prevent new attacks by enlisting local police in
the search for terrorists (Berger 2002; Biden 2003; Flanagan 2002;
Northeast Regional Homeland Security Agreement 2003). Schol-
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ars, too, have come to expect that local police will play a large role
in many aspects of homeland security. One recent analysis indicat-
ed that local police would soon be ‘‘developing new areas of in-
vestigative expertise, cooperating much more with federal law
enforcement and intelligence agencies, working more closely with
the military, increasing their levels of surveillance over their com-
munities, [and] paying more attention to the safety of critical in-
frastructure’’ (Maguire & King 2004:21).
This view about the local role in homeland security is oppor-
tunistic in the sense that it treats the massive institutional capacity
of local policing as a resource that can be mobilized for any end that
policy makers desire. It reflects an understanding of federal sys-
tems in which ‘‘any activity performed by nations can be performed
by cities’’ (Peterson 1981:15), so local governments can easily be
enlisted in the service of national goals. In political science, this
conception of federalism had its heyday in the 1970s after Grodzins
(1966) described the federal system as a ‘‘marble cake,’’ meaning
that policy functions were distributed somewhat arbitrarily among
local, state, and national governments. But as Peterson (1981) has
argued, this perspective fails to account for the distinctive limits
within which local government operates.
This article analyzes how the fragmented and decentralized
nature of American government shapes the local role in homeland
security by investigating the experiences of the Dearborn, Mich-
igan, police department. To guide this investigation, I draw from
and extend Peterson’s (1981) theory of local governmentFone of
the leading theories of local government in political science, but
one that has not been incorporated into sociolegal studies. Peter-
son’s theory sheds light on the local role in homeland security by
showing how local government’s limited powers influence the in-
terests cities have, the political dynamics that express those inter-
ests, and the policy choices that emerge. That analysis extends our
understanding of the police function and the politics of local po-
licing by showing how both are shaped by the decentralization of
American government. Moreover, by bringing Peterson’s theory to
bear on policing, this analysis extends that theory (via a return to
its Weberian roots) to incorporate the distinctive interests impli-
cated by legal institutions.
Dearborn is a fruitful place to examine these issues. Because it
has one of the nation’s largest concentrations of Arab Americans and
has been a major focus of national attention since 9/11, its experi-
ence illustrates with special clarity how a city’s interests in honor and
the legitimate use of police authority are relevant to its homeland
security efforts. In Dearborn, those interests drove police to em-
phasize what I call the community protection functions of homeland
security (especially emergency response and protective security for
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potential targets) and avoid what I call the offender search functions
(investigative efforts to locate those who have committed or intend
to commit terrorist acts). If the forces that shaped Dearborn’s de-
cisions are general, then local governments are well-situated to ad-
minister community protection functions but poorly situated to
administer offender searchFa conclusion that challenges the op-
portunistic view of the local role in homeland security.
Local Government and the Police Role
Recent research already suggests limits to the local role in
homeland security. To support its lobbying efforts asking the fed-
eral government for increased homeland security funds, the U.S.
Conference of Mayors surveyed 192 cities to document their new
homeland security activities and costs since 9/11. Of the 159 cities
that described those activities, only five listed even minimal inves-
tigative efforts focused on potential terrorists, and the report’s own
summary of the most common activities identified 10 categories of
community protection tasks (e.g., hazmat response, building secu-
rity, and investigation of suspicious packages delivered locally) and
no offender search tasks (U.S. Conference of Mayors 2002:11).
The survey was hardly systematic, and it may well misreport the
level of local offender search activities. Nevertheless, it is striking
that even in a political document commissioned to demonstrate
how extensive local homeland security efforts are, very few cities
reported any offender search work at all.
On reflection, this pattern is not surprising. Local governments
are responsible for the well-being of particular territories, and that
responsibility limits the policy functions they can and should pur-
sue. For example, if a policy mainly benefits jurisdictions other
than the one that bears its burdens, it is unlikely that any local
government will pursue it; indeed it would generally be inappro-
priate for a local government to do so because local governments
should mainly serve local interests (Peterson 1981). That obvious
fact has important implications for the local role in homeland se-
curity because there is often a geographic mismatch between the
costs and benefits of anti-terrorism activities. The distinction be-
tween community protection and offender search helps make this
point more precisely. Community protection encompasses all the
tasks involved in protecting a specific place against terrorism, in-
cluding target hardening, preventive patrol focused on likely tar-
gets of terrorist attack, response to threats against a specific target,
and the development of emergency response plans. Offender
search encompasses all the tasks involved in identifying and inves-
tigating particular people suspected of involvement in terrorist
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activities, either to bring them to justice after they have committed
an attack or to prevent them from doing so in the first place. This
distinction is important because the two tasks typically distribute
their benefits and costs differently. When a city pursues community
protection, both the benefits and the costs redound to the city itself
because community protection safeguards just those people and
places the city chooses. But since terrorism is a national or even
international problem, the benefits of offender search do not nec-
essarily accrue to the city where potential terrorists reside, while
the costs do. A city that increases its offender search efforts must
spend its own resources and place its own residents under in-
creased surveillance to prevent acts of terrorism that in all prob-
ability will take place elsewhere.
It is instructive to compare homeland security to conventional
crime control in this regard. As Thacher (2001a) and Wilson (1972)
observed, community concerns about police harassment generate
pressure for police to minimize police surveillance when they tar-
get street crime, but concerns about safety create countervailing
pressures to increase it. These conflicting concerns make policing
street crime a contentious issue, but since pressures arise in both
directions, the final equilibrium usually does involve some atten-
tion to offender search when the topic is crime control. When the
topic is homeland security, however, the people who suffer the
burdens of police surveillance often differ from the people who
enjoy its benefits, so no local police department has much reason to
pursue it.
Localism in the Police Role
Scholarship about the police sometimes makes little of their
territorial commitments, suggesting that police focus not on spe-
cific places but on specific functions such as order maintenance
(Banton 1964; Wilson 1968), information-brokering (Ericson &
Haggerty 1997), the situationally rational use of force (Bittner
1990), or crime control (Skolnick 1975; Bayley 1994). For example,
William Westley concluded that police felt they got more credit for
getting ‘‘a good pinch’’ than for keeping a ‘‘clean beat’’ (1953:35–
6). From that perspective, what matters is whether offender search
activities offer police the opportunity to make good pinches or
perform any of their other defining tasks, not whether they im-
prove the well-being of a particular place. As I will show later in this
article, such occupational norms often did influence Dearborn’s
initial approach to homeland security. Nevertheless, it would be a
mistake to ignore the territorial commitments of police entirely.
At the level of individual officers, many studies demonstrate
that police take responsibility for law and order mainly within their
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assigned beats, ignoring or even contributing to illegality and dis-
order elsewhere. Rubinstein captured this focus clearly, writing
that a patrol officer ‘‘has no need to know about places beyond the
district’s limits. The first thing he learns about his district, after the
location of the station house, is its boundaries. His knowledge of
what lies beyond them is limited and his curiosity restricted’’
(1973:129). More recently, Herbert analyzed police territoriality at
length (1997a, b). The bulk of his analysis examined how police use
control of space to maintain order, but in places his work also sug-
gested how geography defines the limits of police responsibility. In
one anecdote, two officers near the eastern boundary of their beat
frisked four suspicious youth:
None of these searches bear fruit, so they release the young men
and tell them to leave the area. They begin to walk west, but the
officer in charge yells at them to walk in the other direction. He
wants them to walk east because they will cross the boundary be-
tween two patrol divisions. Once on the other side of the boundary,
the men become some other officer’s concern. (1997b:90)
Since police sometimes actively displace crime into other jurisdic-
tions, it should surprise no one if they are reluctant to take costly
and controversial steps to try to prevent it from arising there.
Policing scholars have said less about this territorial commit-
ment at the organizational level, where the relevant questions are
how and in what sense a police department becomes committed to
the well-being of its city and how that commitment shapes its or-
ganizational and policy choices. When the literature has raised
these questions, it has done so by investigating how local politics
shapes police decisions. Such studies typically echo the broader
literature in urban politics, and like that broader literature they can
be classified according to whose influence they emphasize. For ex-
ample, the view that a ‘‘power elite’’ controls local policymaking
(Hunter 1953) appears in Skolnick’s earliest work, which refers to
the demands of ‘‘the so-called power structure of the community’’
to explain why police emphasize crime control over legality
(1975:242), and the view that the push and pull of interest groups
shapes local policy (Dahl 1961) dominates the community policing
literature, which often treats the community organizations that
partner with police as devices for bringing neighborhood interests
to police attention (Henig 1978; Skogan 1988; Bass 2000; Thacher
2001a). Other scholars imply that police decisions come from the
preferences of the electorate as a whole (Ostrom & Whitaker 1973),
from police themselves (Wilson 1968:227–32; Lyons 1999), or from
a mix of pressures from all these actors (Heinz et al. 1983). Finally,
Wilson’s seminal study of the politics of policing suggests that in
those rare cases when the local polity influences police decisions at
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all, it typically does so through party politics and interest group
pressure (1968:236–71), which enforce a ‘‘zone of indifference’’
within which police exercise discretion (1968:233).
These studies have made valuable contributions to knowledge
about the politics of policing, but they share an important limita-
tion with the broader urban politics literature that they echo. In an
influential critique of that literature, Peterson described it as an
‘‘internal’’ perspective on local policymaking that looks for the
factors that influence policy choices by examining political forces
within the cityF‘‘the rivalry among groups, the patterns of coali-
tion formation, the presence or absence of competitive political
parties, the power of local elites, or the vagaries of political cam-
paigns’’ (1981:3). Peterson argued that this overt drama offers only
a surface view of local policymaking because the roles its actors play
are partly shaped offstage.
In making this argument, Peterson emphasized that local gov-
ernments have only a fraction of the federal government’s powers
F‘‘they cannot make war or peace; they cannot issue passports or
forbid outsiders from entering their territory; they cannot issue
currency; and they cannot control imports or erect tariff walls’’
(1981:4)Fand he suggested that the implications of these limits
pervade local policymaking. For example, local governments’ in-
ability to set monetary policy, forbid businesses and wealthy house-
holds from leaving, or prevent influxes of unskilled workers puts
them in a precarious fiscal position that limits their policy choices;
in particular, it makes redistributive policies nearly hopeless at the
local level.
Peterson suggested that politicians, bureaucrats, and even in-
terest groups all tend to become aware of these limits, at least
implicitly, so they influence the positions that rational political ac-
tors take in the overt drama the internal perspective examines. For
example, he criticized community power studies as follows: ‘‘When
‘power-elite’ theorists identified a small group of power holders,
they regarded the decisions this group made as the primary factors
determining local policy. In fact these leaders were largely re-
sponding to factors external to the community that were quite be-
yond the control of the ‘power elite’’’ (1981:5). City politicians and
bureaucrats have even more reason to adapt their preferences to
those limits: if they do not, they risk driving dissatisfied residents
away and ultimately going bankrupt (1981:29). Aware of these
risks, city officials deflect political pressure to make bad policy
choices (1981:182–3), and they embrace outside groups whose in-
terests align with the city’s (1981:141). In this way, ‘‘reputation,
respectability, popularity, and power flow to those who take the
city’s interests as their own, or who are fortunate enough to have
special interests that converge with those of the city’’ (1981:145).
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In offering this critique, Peterson did not claim that analysts
should ignore the push and pull of local politics entirely. He simply
argued that to interpret the meaning of that visible drama, scholars
should consider how structural features of local government shape
it (1981:131–83). For example, where much of the policing liter-
ature has treated the expressed demands of political actors as
brute, un-analyzable facts about the world (e.g., Skolnick 1975:242;
Wilson 1968:228; Thacher 2001a:776), Peterson directed attention
to the features of local governance that shape these preferences in
the first place, recognizing that the limits of local government con-
strain the kinds of policy preferences that political actors can sen-
sibly pursue and city officials can reasonably accommodate. This
analytic strategy may give some coherence to an otherwise ad hoc
review of arbitrary political demands.
To conceptualize the constraints on local government con-
cisely, Peterson proposed to treat cities as a particular kind of
social structure that, like all social structures, have interests deter-
mined by ‘‘their place in the larger socioeconomic and polit-
ical context’’ (1981:4). ‘‘Just as we can speak of union interests,
judicial interests, and the interests of politicians, so we can speak
of the interests of that structured system of social interactions
that we call a city’’ (1981:17). While recognizing that there exist
diverse roles within a city, Peterson defined city interests as the
component of individuals’ overall interests that they have by virtue
of their residence or movement in a particular legal jurisdictionF
one whose powers are limited in the ways noted above (1981:21).
Peterson went on to argue that local governments have reason
to pursue just those policies that advance city interests defined in
this way.
This argument does not imply that city interests determine policy
choices. In many cases it is debatable whether a policy will serve a
city’s interests, so the ideal of serving city interests shapes the kind
arguments that political actors make without determining the con-
clusions they reach (Peterson 1981:22, 132–3). In other cases, pol-
icy decisions have little effect on the interests of the city as a whole
but simply allocate a fixed pie of benefits to various groups, so the
preferences political actors express will more obviously reflect
group interests (1981:150–66). Finally, in later work Peterson ar-
gued that local governments occasionally act against the city’s in-
terests, particularly when highly professionalized occupational
groups implement federal programs (though even here, profes-
sionals may be reined in if an issue attracts publicity or political
leaders exercise especially rigid control) (Peterson et al. 1986). This
last idea is very relevant to the local role in homeland security, since
I have already noted how occupational norms in policing may
support offender search activities.
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Peterson’s theory remains one of the most influential analyses
of local government in political science, but like any influential
theory it has been subject to incisive criticisms (e.g., Stone 2004).
This is not the place to review those criticisms in detail, since the
most significant focus on details of Peterson’s framework that are
not relevant for my purposes (such as his claim that what he calls
‘‘developmental’’ policies inspire little political controversy) or de-
tails I will challenge myself (such as his claim that the city has a
unitary interest in enhancing its economic position). Instead, I
propose to ask what follows for our understanding of local policing
Fand particularly the local role in homeland securityFif we pur-
sue Peterson’s basic idea that it can be useful to treat cities as social
structures with interests of their own.
City Limits Revisited
Peterson developed his theory of city interests by applying a
more general argument from Weber, who argued that all social
actors have interests in their economic position, social honor, and
political power (1978:926–40), but he quickly set aside honor and
power as matters of little importance for cities to focus on their
economic interestsFin particular, their ‘‘attractiveness as a locale
for economic activity’’ (Peterson 1981:22). This perspective works
reasonably well for policy issues such as infrastructure, land use,
and economic development, where costs and benefits are primarily
economic, but a conception of city interests that focuses mainly on
economic interests does not adequately capture the interests im-
plicated by legal institutions. Police efforts to maintain order and
control crime do help local economies to function, but police also
play a role in a system of punishment that maintains the moral
order as much as the economic order. More important, the costs of
policing are only partly economic costs. Legal institutions distribute
not only financial benefits and burdens; they also, and more dis-
tinctively, distribute the benefits and burdens associated with the
use of governmental coercive authorityFnotably the surveillance
and information-gathering used to identify deviance (Marx 1988)
and the coercive force used to stop it (Bittner 1990). The challenge
is to conceptualize the city’s interests in a way that connects with
these features of legal institutions.
It is more difficult to meet that challenge than it may first ap-
pear (Imbroscio 2003). Since the goal is to treat the city as a social
actor in its own right, it will not suffice to incorporate individual
interests as they relate to police surveillance and coercion; instead,
one must adequately define the interests of the city itself. I propose
to meet this challenge by returning to the two Weberian interests
Peterson set aside.
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The first is the interest status honor. Since police surveillance
implies that the object of surveillance cannot be trusted, and the
use of coercion stigmatizes its object as outright blameworthy, po-
licing implicates the interest in status honor. A few scholars have
recognized how officers’ street-level decisions can confer honor and
stigma on individuals (Oberweis & Musheno 1999; Ericson &
Haggerty 1997:443; Applebaum 1996), but the Dearborn case il-
lustrates how police policy decisions can confer honor and stigma on
groupsFparticularly the city’s large Arab American community (as
Weber noted, status honor attaches especially to racial and ethnic
groups [1978:390–3]), and also on the city as a whole. To be sure,
surveillance does not always have this consequence. If surveillance
targets a generic and abstract class of suspected criminals, no iden-
tifiable social group need be singled out for suspicion. But when
surveillance focuses heavily on an identifiable group, the group’s
honor may be damaged, particularly if it is already precarious. This
distinction is important in the context of homeland security be-
cause of the ethnic overtones of current discussions about terror-
ism. Since most Americans assume that offender search focuses on
Arabs, new efforts may threaten that group’s honor by implying
that its members are untrustworthy. In a city such as Dearborn,
whose public image is tied closely to its ethnic composition, effects
on Arab honor carry over to the city’s own reputation, and to
preserve its honor it must either preserve the reputation of the
relevant ethnic group or disentangle its public image from that of
the group. The Dearborn case illustrates how these conflicts over
ethnic honor and city reputation are partly fought out in, and
therefore shape, homeland security decisions.
Second, policing also implicates a city’s interest in the legitimate
use of authority, since its political power depends on perceptions of
local government legitimacy (Weber 1978:213).1 If police use their
authority recklessly, they may undermine public cooperation (Tyler
2004) and suffer instability and interference from their overseers
(Crank & Langworthy 1992). In extreme cases, local agencies have
been placed under the oversight of state commissions or court re-
ceivers because they misspent their authority rather than their
money (Moore 1995:209)Fincidents that vividly illustrate how the
limited sovereignty of local government shapes cities’ policymaking
freedom. A desire to avoid this fate gives city officials reason to
worry about the legitimate use of authority, just as a desire to avoid
1 Here the city is a somewhat awkward social actor for the Weberian typology of
interests. Its power is a not a matter of its ability to seize the reins of local government
(Weber 1978:939)Fsomething it enjoys almost by definition in a decentralized systemF
but of the strength, and hence legitimacy, of the government it controls.
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fiscal bankruptcy (Peterson 1981: Ch. 10) gives them reason to
worry about economic interests.
The challenge facing both scholars and political actors is to de-
fine what makes the use of authority legitimate. That challenge is
particularly difficult today because, as recent scholarship demon-
strates, modern policing relies less on outright coercion than on
surveillance and information-gathering (Ericson & Haggerty 1997;
Marx 1988). Since those techniques do not obviously involve coer-
cive authority (Ericson & Haggerty 1997:133; Foucault 1977:177),
some observers worry that it may be difficult to define legitimate
boundaries for their use. Thus Foucault, whose ideas partly inspired
this scholarship about policing, argued that there is a mismatch be-
tween the concepts of modern political theory and the practices of
modern powerFthat the juridical language the Enlightenment de-
veloped to regulate the exercise of power cannot do the job ade-
quately because disciplinary power evades its categories (1977:223,
303; 1980:107–8). There are reasons to question Foucault’s bleak
conclusion, since his analysis of resistance to disciplinary power suf-
fered from serious empirical (Brenner 1994) and normative (Fraser
1981) gaps; indeed, even his specific argument that modern political
theory cannot regulate modern power seems overdrawn, since it is
not clear that traditional juridical ideas about the legitimate use of
state authority (such as those that emphasize individual rights and
the procedural regularity required by the rule of law) have outlived
their usefulness (Walzer 1983b:489). Still, Foucault’s analysis con-
tains the kernel of a valid concern, so there remains a need to study
the reasons for resistance to disciplinary power.
The Dearborn case contributes to such study by illustrating
how surveillance and information-gathering can have chilling ef-
fects on a city’s social life that may undermine trust and cooper-
ation with police. As Nagel argued, the degree to which our private
and community lives are exposed to the watching eyes of a broader
public affects our ability to maintain trusting social relationships. As
‘‘interpersonal spheres of privacy protected from the public gaze’’
erode (Nagel 1998:20), many of our relationships may become
untenable. If they persist at all, we enter them burdened by a need
to conform to the expectations of the wider society that watches us,
unable to speak and act in ways that give expression to our own
sense of who we are and how we fit into the local social milieu.
Thus police surveillance and information-gathering may under-
mine trusting relationships between police and the community, so
cities have a reason to want to minimize it (though of course other
interests may give them countervailing reasons to increase it). Even
procedurally well-regulated police surveillance threatens this city
interest, so this analysis supplements recent literature that mainly
associates police legitimacy with procedural fairness.
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These extensions to Peterson’s theory offer useful conceptual
tools for the analysis of legal institutions, which Peterson himself
mostly neglected. As I demonstrate, interests in honor and the
legitimate use of authority particularly influence the local role in
homeland security, driving local police to embrace community
protection while contributing to controversy about offender search.
The Study
To investigate the city interests that shape the local role in
homeland security, I analyzed how that role evolved in Dearborn in
order to develop what Dworkin would call a ‘‘constructive’’ inter-
pretation of the city’s decisionmaking (Dworkin 1986). Such an
interpretation must both fit empirical evidence about what the city
did and provide a normative argument that explains why those
actions were valuable (e.g., because they serve particular interests
or exemplify particular moral principles). Dworkin developed the
concept of a constructive interpretation to clarify how judges and
legal scholars should analyze a body of law, but as several scholars
have suggested (Dworkin 1986:46–73; Nonet & Selznick 1978;
Thacher 2001b, forthcoming), constructive interpretations can be
developed for many social practices other than adjudication. Here
I propose to do that for the governance of cities. Conceiving of a
city’s decisionmaking in some policy area as a particular kind of
social practice, I aim to develop a constructive interpretation of that
practice that both fits the main details of what political actors do
and identifies the purpose of their actions in terms of the city in-
terests they can plausibly be taken to serve. The normative di-
mension of this analysis is indispensable because (notwithstanding
Greenstone & Peterson 1975:60–3) any claim about what a city’s
interests really are cannot help but be a normative claim, and as
such it requires normative justification.
This agenda requires a detailed historical account of Dear-
born’s homeland security activities and the public and internal de-
bates that informed them. To develop that account, I gathered
information through interviews, observations, and document re-
view. On the community side, I conducted open-ended interviews
with leaders and members of the city’s most prominent Arab
American institutions (including the Arab Community Center for
Economic and Social Services [ACCESS], the Lebanese-American
Heritage Club, and a neighborhood organization serving the
neighborhoods with the city’s largest Arab population) as well as
two informal leaders in the Arab community; I also held shorter
conversations with members of the American-Arab Anti-Discrim-
ination Committee (ADC) and the American-Arab Chamber of
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Commerce. On the government side, I conducted interviews with
the mayor, the police chief, and several Dearborn Police Depart-
ment (DPD) command staff members, focusing on those who were
closely involved in homeland security. (Because Dearborn is a
strong-mayor city characterized by relatively centralized control, it
was particularly important to discuss major decisions with the
mayor.) I also observed and interviewed the city’s community po-
licing officers, and I observed several neighborhood association
meetings. Finally, I reviewed information from written documents,
including government reports, articles in Detroit and Dearborn
newspapers since 1988, and more than 100 informational e-mails
from community groups.
As I reviewed the case study material, I sought to identify a
manageable number of homeland security decisions the city made
that together would cover its most important policy initiatives in
this area. In the end, I focused on four: the city’s response to the
threat of hate crimes after 9/11, its response to media attention
after the attacks, its decision about the role it would play in federal
interviews with recent immigrants about terrorism, and its creation
of a local homeland security office. I do not think it will be con-
troversial when I claim that these are the most significant parts of
Dearborn’s homeland security practice. My account of how these
episodes unfolded, however, may be more controversialFthat is
inevitable in this kind of researchFbut since I have foregone the
usual custom of disguising place names, in principle readers can
verify, contest, or elaborate on my account by returning to (most of)
my sources, something that is a common practice among historians
but perhaps rarer than it should be among social scientists. In any
case, I have shared a draft of the case study with several people I
spoke with in Dearborn (including the mayor, three members of
the DPD’s command staff, the DPD patrol officer involved most
directly in homeland security, and two community leaders), and
none objected to my account.
In analyzing these four episodes, I aimed to develop a con-
structive interpretation of Dearborn’s homeland security practice
that both fit the details of the decisions the city actually made and
identified the city interests those decisions served. Readers who
wish to challenge my interpretation need to show that I failed in
this effortFi.e., that my interpretation does not account for the
choices Dearborn officials made or that it does not recognize im-
portant city interests or obligations that are relevant to those
choices. My analysis was mostly inductive, though it inevitably drew
on my knowledge of related literature. As I reviewed all the ev-
idence that described how the city made a particular decision, I
tried to identify recurrent interests that either seemed to drive
those responses or were relevant to it even where the participants
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did not recognize (or admit to) that fact. Doing that meant focusing
not only on the reasons that interviewees themselves gave for their
actions, but also asking how their actions might serve interests they
did not mention. Often that meant supplementing information
from city officials with information from other interviewees, from
observations, or from review of written documents; although of-
ficial decision makers usually knew more than anyone else about
the city’s policy decisions, in some cases they also had more reason
to shade the truth.
With its large and vibrant Arab community, Dearborn is clearly
an extreme case, but because it is extreme it highlights important
dynamics that are otherwise hard to discern (Burawoy 1998). Con-
cerns about honor and the legitimate use of authority may be less
salient in most other American cities, so those cities may have more
scope for offender search. At the same time, the Dearborn case
does have implications for national discussions about homeland
securityFnot only because it calls attention to forces that operate
less visibly in other cities but also because it does probably reflect
the dynamics of exactly those cities where policy makers would
most like to gain local cooperation for offender search. For exam-
ple, when the U.S. Department of Justice sought to interview 5,000
recent immigrants about terrorism, Dearborn apparently had the
largest number of interviewees per capita in the nation (see U.S.
General Accounting Office [GAO] 2003:29–31, and the discussion
of the number of interviewees in Dearborn below).
The Evolution of Homeland Security in Dearborn
More than 200,000 Arab Americans live in metropolitan De-
troit, making the region home to one of the largest concentrations
of Arabs in the world outside the Middle East. Dearborn, a near-in
suburb that borders Detroit to the west, is in many ways the center
of this regional ethnic community. Dearborn is the location of many
important regional institutions and events, including ACCESS, the
Midwest headquarters of the ADC, the American-Arab Chamber of
Commerce, and the Dearborn Arab International festival (which
organizers describe as the largest annual Arab festival in the na-
tion). Dearborn’s Arab population has grown steadily since the
1960s, when waves of displaced immigrants began arriving from
troubled areas in the Middle East, joining a smaller number of
earlier immigrants who had come to Dearborn seeking economic
opportunity in the auto industry. All told, Dearborn is home to
98,000 residents, 29,300 of whom told U.S. Census interviewers
they were of Arabic ancestry. The largest group by far is Lebanese,
but other sizable groups include Iraqis, Palestinians, and Yemenis
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(U.S. Census Bureau 2000). City officials say the city’s daytime
population is three times its residential population; among other
businesses, Dearborn hosts the world headquarters of the Ford
Motor Company.
Dearborn’s Arab community has had a rocky history with local
police. The city’s Arab population began to grow at a time when a
reputation for racial intolerance still tarred Dearborn, which was
run from 1942 to 1978 by openly segregationist Mayor Orville
Hubbard. Hubbard’s extreme racial views focused mainly on
blacks (in one notorious incident, he stood on Dearborn’s border
with Detroit holding a shotgun and dared blacks to cross city lines),
but longtime members of Dearborn’s Arab community also recall
police harassment toward Arabs during the final years of Hub-
bard’s reign. ‘‘As this became an Arab community, you had things
like anti-war demonstrations down here,’’ one Arab resident ex-
plained, referring to the 1960s and 1970s. ‘‘And a lot of public
activity down here which the police also played a directing role in.
Like somebody who was with a megaphone, they would take it
away from them. And also a sense that the police were spying on
pro-Arab activity in the community.’’ In the late 1980s, the police
department faced two scandals that further damaged its relation-
ship with the Arab community: one of the department’s few Arab
officers sued the city for a hostile work environment, and residents
and business owners accused two community substation officers of
harassment. Well into the mid-1990s, Dearborn police still had a
poor reputation in the Arab community. After an incident at a local
high school in 1990, community leaders prevailed upon the FBI
and the local U.S. Attorney to investigate the department for abus-
ing several Arab students. Eventually the FBI concluded that there
was no evidence officers had behaved improperly, but the city later
settled a civil suit filed by the alleged victims without admitting any
wrongdoing. The result of these and other incidents, one Arab
resident of the city explained, was that ‘‘there were about five years
of just outright hostility to city government and the police’’ during
the early 1990s. Police themselves emphasized the federal inves-
tigation into the high school incident as a low point in their re-
lationship with the community.
City officials took several steps to try to repair this relationship,
including hiring more Arab police officers and working more
closely with organizers of community events. The city’s most ex-
tensive effort, however, came in 1996, when it opened a new com-
munity policing substation in predominantly Arab East Dearborn.
City officials hoped the program would improve community rela-
tions by providing less-contentious opportunities for officers to
interact with residents and build trust. Today, officers who work
for the station describe their main job as interacting with the
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community to provide services and address quality of life concerns
that patrol officers do not have time for. One explained that as a
result, community residents ‘‘feel comfortable telling me [about a
problem] instead of some guy they never saw before that just
showed up on a radio call.’’ Arab community leaders, who uni-
formly applaud community policing in Dearborn, echoed the sen-
timent. By all accounts, these initiatives did help mend the DPD’s
relationship with the Arab community, even if they did not relieve
every source of tension. One Arab community leader who has been
critical of police explained:
I wouldn’t say that everything is hunky-dory but people are will-
ing to give some benefit of doubt to the police now. There’s an old
saying: if your friend does something he made a mistake; if your
enemy does it he did it on purpose. I think that that’s what’s
going on here. They’re less in the enemy camp from people’s
point of view. They’re not exactly considered our best friends in
the community by most Arab Americans. But they’re not con-
sidered the enemy either anymore.
Other leaders in the Arab community echoed this basic conclusion,
and many offered a more optimistic account of police-community
relations.
This history is important background because after the Sep-
tember 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by 19 Middle Eastern men, po-
lice-community relations in Dearborn’s Arab community became a
major concern, as Arab Americans’ relationship with law enforce-
ment became strained throughout the country. In the event, al-
though some strain between local law enforcement and Arab
Americans did arise in Dearborn, it never spiraled out of control to
create a serious crisis of police-community relations in the city. In
one police commander’s estimation, the city’s ability to avoid this
potential crisis was a direct result of the trust that had developed
between police and Dearborn’s Arab community:
I guess the best way I can explain all this is that it was like a
stepladder. You know, we were at the bottom of the stepladder
there for a while. And then we took the first step, and then each
rung leading right up to 9/11Fwhich [is] when it really proved to
be invaluable. . . . I’ll swear by the day I die that if [9/11] were five
years sooner, or six or eight years before we started really de-
veloping that stepladder . . . .
It was not only that the new relationship between police and the
Arab community helped the city cope with the challenges of 9/11. It
was also that the earlier history of mistrust between police and the
Arab community served as a vivid warning about the challenges
that could return if police did not take community concerns
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seriously, including federal investigations, harsh media coverage,
and political pressure from community groups.
The remainder of this case study examines more recent history
in Dearborn in two parts. First, the next three sections describe
three major interests relevant to the city’s homeland security plans
by recounting three episodes in which each interest played a cen-
tral role. Second, the final section illustrates how all three interests
came together to shape the mandate of the city’s Office of Home-
land Security.
Protecting the Community Against Retaliation
The DPD displayed its orientation toward community protec-
tion in its immediate reactions to 9/11. In its first significant re-
sponse, the city convened a series of community meetings with
local Arab leaders to learn about community concerns during this
unprecedented time. As Mayor Guido explained, ‘‘It was a very
unsettling timeFif there’s anything we learned it’s just that eve-
rybody in town just felt uncomfortable, so we were unsure about
what might be on the minds of Arab community leaders.’’ Conse-
quently, staff from the mayor’s office and the police department
used their newly forged community networks to contact several
community leaders immediately after the attacks, inviting them
and anyone they wanted to bring to a series of informal meetings in
the DPD’s training room. The initial meetings, held weekly, were
standing-room only, with several dozen city officials and commu-
nity leaders attending. ‘‘We just wanted information about what
they were thinking and how they were feeling so that we could
react to the issues that we felt we needed to,’’ Guido explained.
That is not to say that city officials internalized all the views they
were exposed to. Community leaders who attended the meetings
said they focused mainly on two themes: protection from hate
crimes and concerns about their civil liberties. Some believed police
were responsive to both sets of concerns, but others suggested that
police listened more closely to the first set. One explained:
I think the police wanted to project a view that everything’s OK in
Dearborn and everybody’s getting along and everybody’s pro-
tected. I think from our point of view we did not feel that way,
and we wanted assurance in a larger sense than they were able to
convey [about] defense of our rights and that kind of stuff. I think
they were more trying to project an image. But to be fair they did
several things that were usefulFput police out at mosques dur-
ing certain periods and so forth.
Indeed, some DPD members remembered only part of the con-
cerns community leaders said they raised. ‘‘It was usually about
safety issues,’’ one police official remembered of the meetings.
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‘‘About extra patrol and how we can secure and make their com-
munity feel a little more safe, because they were certainly con-
cerned about retaliatory action.’’ Notably absent in this account is
any mention of the concerns that community members said they
raised about respect for civil liberties, and the accounts of other
police (though not all of them)2 are similar in this respect. It is not
that police actively resisted the community’s civil liberties concerns.
Frank discussion of civil liberties did take place later around spe-
cific issues such as the Justice Department interview project. It is
just that police seized more quickly on concerns about public safety
because they resonated more easily with their own sense of their
professional responsibilities.
In keeping with this view about its primary mission, city gov-
ernment responded quickly to concerns about retaliation. Mayor
Guido appeared on local television the afternoon of September 11
to warn viewers against committing hate crimes, and the DPD de-
ployed patrol cars near potential Arab targets by early afternoon.
On September 12, the DPD put officers on 12-hour shifts for the
first time in many department veterans’ memory to offer extra
patrol around mosques, the Arab business district, and local schools
with large Arab populations. One police commander explained
these efforts as follows:
I heard from several people that the Arabic people in the com-
munity were actually fearful for their selves because the media
was spinning this so much that a lot of people were fearful to
come out. There was a drop in business for a while [in] our res-
taurants and grocery stores . . . And we met with them over and
over and over and the chief explained, ‘‘We are doing this. We
did go to 12-hour [shifts]. We are obviously more concerned. We
know what we have to do, we’re doing it.’’ That is what we do for
a living.
This account, echoed by other police, suggests how easily the com-
munity calls for protection resonated with the core concerns of
policeFthe sense that ‘‘that is what we do for a living.’’ In par-
ticular, this commander expressed a hope to provide a level of
protection that would enable the city’s business life to return to
normal. So although the department’s community networks en-
sured that it was exposed to the concerns of Arab leaders, that
dialogue was filtered through the lens of the police’s sense of their
primary role as the guarantors of public order; police internalized
and acted most readily on community concerns that spoke to that
self-image.
2 One DPD member who attended the meetings recalled, ‘‘They were up front. They
wanted to know are we going to pull them over, call INS, and stuff like that. We told them
no. It’s going to be regular stuff, legit stuff.’’
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As the DPD stepped up patrol to protect Arab institutions and
neighborhoods against hate crimes, it also tried to prevent them by
discouraging large demonstrations that could become targets. City
officials did ultimately approve all demonstrations that community
members proposed, but they also appealed to community leaders to
exercise restraint. For example, during an early meeting between
city officials and community leaders, a Yemeni leader indicated that
his community wanted to organize a demonstration to express sup-
port for America and condemn the terrorist attacks. City officials,
however, asked him not to. ‘‘Because other people are going to
interpret that as a protest so soon after,’’ a DPD manager explained.
‘‘It could cause some serious mob rioting type problems. So they
listened to us and there was never a march. . . . I think we prevented
a lot of people from getting hurt.’’ Instead, he suggested, commu-
nity members might show support for the United States by writing
newspaper articles and letters. Other city officials raised similar
concerns about marches. Mayor Guido explained:
We did sit down and ask [community leaders] to review the rules
of marches and demonstrations. . . . From a public safety per-
spective, I can’t have public streets blocked and I can’t bring in
100 police officers while people protest Israel, Palestine, or the
U.S. policy on Iraq. . . . It’s a safety hazard and given current
tensions, it could cause future problems for our community. Pro-
tests can lead to all kinds of unforeseen conflicts with passersby,
both on foot and in cars. Some angry guy out in a cabin in the
middle of Montana will watch this on the news, see where in
Michigan it’s taking place and say to himself, ‘‘I think I’ll go over
there.’’ We don’t need that.
Here the city’s concern about hate crimes was not just a response to
community sentiment. To the contrary, in this example it arose out
of officials’ own sense that maintaining public order was their pri-
mary goal. Eventually, however, many Arab community members
came to share city officials’ viewpoint, as discussed below.
In any case, the DPD’s focus on public safety concerns was
evident in these two ways: by the rapid steps it took to provide
security for potential targets, and its discomfort with public dem-
onstrations that might call attention to the city and make it a target
for retaliation. Dearborn’s quick response to the threat of hate
crimes after 9/11 earned it praise in a report from Human Rights
Watch (2002), which singled out Dearborn as the only city among
six studied nationally that responded adequately to the threat. That
quick response was made possible by two converging factors: the
city’s pre-existing relationship with the Arab community, which
gave police information about where concerns about retaliation
were most debilitating, and police views of their role as guarantors
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of public order in the city. In this case, police concerns and com-
munity knowledge reinforced one another to single out an impor-
tant interest for local government to pursue.
Shrinking From the Spotlight
Discomfort with political demonstrations also had another di-
mension, one that illustrates concerns about the city’s national im-
age. In the months after 9/11, city residents and officials became
concerned about the level and type of media attention Dearborn
was receiving. In a widely circulated e-mail, one Arab resident
vented frustration about the recent surge in demonstrations:
Yes, I support freedom of speech, freedom of expression, freedom
of assembly, peaceful expression of different opinions, etc. But
frankly I am sick and tired of all of the demonstrations and/or
marches that are so often organized to take place in Dearborn. . . .
Possible examples of the downside to the numerous demonstra-
tions/marches in Dearborn: The continual negative publicity and
spotlight on Dearborn; the drain on local taxpayers for additional
police personnel, including overtime; the disruption to traffic,
residents, and businesses; the potential for lowering of property
values; businesses not wanting to locate in a possibly volatile,
unstable location; the potential for violence; and the local ill will
created which often lingers long after the demonstrations/marches.
Mixed in among a number of pragmatic concerns, such as the
drain on city finances for crowd control, was a concern about ‘‘the
continual negative publicity and spotlight on Dearborn.’’ The
ADC’s Imad Hamad responded sympathetically, writing, ‘‘I hear
you very well and I do not think that you are out of track here. I
personally not a fan of demonstration period except in very rare
occasions.’’ Elsewhere, Hamad himself had raised concerns about
what he ruefully called ‘‘the Dearborn Syndrome’’Fthe prominent
place Dearborn had unwillingly come to occupy in national dis-
cussions about terrorism and 9/11 (Niemiec 2002). Thus even the
region’s most politically active Arab organization, which might be
expected to resist any attempt to temper public demonstrations,
ultimately echoed city officials’ concerns.
Both residents and city officials saw two subtexts to what they
viewed as the excessive coverage of Dearborn in local and national
media. First, they felt that many media stories implied that Dear-
born might be home to Arab terrorists or sympathizers. (At times
the implication was explicit, as when radio talk show host Howard
Stern repeated false rumors that Dearborn Arabs had rioted in the
streets to celebrate the attacksFrumors that also plagued other
Arab centers such as Paterson, New Jersey [Moritz 2001].) The
implication was worse than troubling, for it questioned the
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patriotism and loyalty of city residents at a time when that aspect of
Arab American identity was under siege. As one Arab American
from Dearborn told a reporter a year after September 11, ‘‘To say
things changed is an understatement. All of a sudden, we had to
prove how American we are’’ (Cohen 2002:S-8). Lebanese immi-
grant Abed Hammoud, who challenged Mayor Guido in the city’s
2001 mayoral election, felt the need to print up a flier denouncing
the terrorist attacks and indicating his loyalty to the United States.
In this context, the explosion of media coverage about Dearborn
seemed to reinforce the idea that the city’s Arab population might
be less than patriotic.
The second concern about media coverage, more important
for the city’s image in Southeast Michigan than at the national level,
was what city officials saw as overdrawn media interest in stories
about hate crimes in Dearborn. In reporting these stories, city of-
ficials felt, the media portrayed Dearborn’s white residents as in-
tolerant holdovers from the segregationist days of Mayor Hubbard.
Where stories about local support for terrorists defamed Dear-
born’s Arab community, stories about hate crimes defamed its non-
Arab community.
City officials believed the media attention to both issues was
unfairly damaging the city’s reputation. ‘‘All this stuffFthat they’re
rioting, that they [Arab residents of Dearborn] hate the police de-
partment or the city, and that the police department hates themF
that’s what the media wants to think,’’ one DPD member insisted.
‘‘We were very concerned over retaliation and hate crimes and
things like that. We were trying to prevent all that, [but the media
was] trying to embellish it into a big problem that really we didn’t
even have. . . . Other towns were having more trouble than we
were’’ (emphasis in original). Another police official echoed the
point, insisting that ‘‘there weren’t any threatsFwe got more me-
dia calls about it than any actual threats.’’ As they responded to
media inquiries, police officials tried to counteract the negative
light being cast on Dearborn. One member of the DPD command
staff recalled:
I would make statements in the media . . . that I’m very proud of
the metropolitan Detroit area and how they’re reacting and han-
dling this sensitive situation of 9/11. . . . I mean there were very
few incidents of any type of hate crime. . . . And one of [the] things
that I always brag about is that through knowing all these [Arab]
community leaders, that if there was actually some type of ter-
rorist activity being planned and they knew about it, they would
come to me and tell me. They don’t want this activity either.
Arab leaders echoed these sentiments. ‘‘It is a tireless and contin-
uous effort to connect negative events to Dearborn,’’ Hamad said
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of the media attention. ‘‘The reality is that Dearborn, as of Sept. 11,
prevailed to be a role model city with a good working relationship
with law enforcement. It is beyond images that may have portrayed
it as a place of residence of many people linked to acts of terrorism’’
(Lewis 2002:S-10).
The DPD’s wary relationship with the media reflected these
concerns about Dearborn’s reputation. Just as Arab American
identity was under siege after 9/11, so was the reputation of a city
with one of the nation’s largest concentration of Arabs. To defend
against the stigma that threatened to taint Dearborn’s image, police
officials repeatedly stressed the patriotism of city residents and
their condemnation of the terrorist attacks, and they became more
attentive to the symbolic implication of their words and actions in
ways I describe shortly. These responses to media attention illus-
trate the important interest that the city developed in defending its
honor after 9/11Fan interest that a wide range of community
groups and city officials shared. Even when the urge to shrink from
the spotlight led police to take the potentially controversial step of
discouraging public demonstrations, community leaders who might
be expected to object never did.
Justice Department Interviews of Recent Immigrants
Concerns about police surveillance and information-gathering
Fwhich were always prominent in the Arab community but were
initially less central for city officialsFtook shape in a more complex
and uncertain way as city government began to define its role in
homeland security. That process is best illustrated by the DPD’s
response to a federal request to help interview recent immigrants
about international terrorism. Because this episode clearly illus-
trates the limits of local offender search efforts, I examine it at
greater length than the previous two episodes.
On November 9, 2001, the U.S. Department of Justice an-
nounced a plan to interview about 5,000 temporary visa-holders
who had recently entered the United States from countries reputed
to have a substantial Al Qaeda presence to gather information that
might be useful in the war on terror. The Justice Department de-
scribed the interviews as voluntary, but a November 9, 2001, memo
from the Deputy Attorney General indicated that the law enforce-
ment officials who conducted the interviews ‘‘should feel free to use
all appropriate means of encouraging an individual to cooperate’’
(Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2001). Of the 5,000 men
initially targeted for interviews, more than 500 lived in Southeast
Michigan, and more than 200 were in Dearborn. By the end of
the project, the Eastern District of Michigan would conduct 330
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interviewsFby far the most of any district in the nation (U.S. GAO
2003:29–31).
Because of the scope of the initiative, the Attorney General
looked beyond the Department of Justice for help. ‘‘Thousands of
individuals have been interviewed,’’ he wrote in a separate No-
vember 9 letter that announced the new plans, referring to earlier
post-9/11 investigations. ‘‘Federal resources have their limits, how-
ever, and we are finding that there are many more people to be
interviewed than there are federal agents to conduct the inter-
views’’ (Office of the Attorney General 2001). Consequently, the
Justice Department planned to enlist help from the regional Anti-
Terrorism Task Forces (which were led by the 94 U.S. Attorneys
and included federal and local law enforcement officials as partic-
ipants). FBI representatives initially suggested that state and local
law enforcement would primarily conduct the interviews, while
federal agents would play a supporting role (Hakim 2001). In this
respect, the interview project is an especially clear example of the
opportunistic view of the local role in homeland security.
Local reactions to the interview project in Dearborn ranged
from wary to outright hostile. Many Arab community members
denounced the interviews as unjustified ethnic profiling, and they
worried that interviewees would face heightened scrutiny from
immigration authorities. One explained that he felt the initiative
‘‘challenged [Arab Americans’] civil rights,’’ stepping over the ‘‘di-
viding line’’ that separated legitimate law enforcement from ille-
gitimate harassment. At the same time, since Arab Americans’
patriotism and support for the war on terror were under suspicion,
Dearborn Arabs had reasons to avoid unqualified opposition to
homeland security efforts. One response to this dilemma was to try
to distinguish the innocent ‘‘us’’ from the guilty ‘‘them.’’ For ex-
ample, one Arab American interviewee implied that too much fuss
had been made about the interviews, explaining, ‘‘If you didn’t do
anything, you don’t have to worry.’’ Even this man, however, com-
plained that federal investigators sometimes continued to press
interviewees after they had established that they knew nothing
about terrorism, and he worried that the list of interviewees was
riddled with mistakesFa concern echoed by other Dearborn res-
idents, police, and even a GAO report (2002). ‘‘A lot of the names
are pretty similar in Dearborn,’’ he explained. ‘‘You know, there
are a lot of people with names like ‘Hussein’.’’ Since 9/11, he felt,
the FBI had become more suspicious of Arabs in the United States
and, as a result, such cases of mistaken identity would be harder to
resolve. So although he did not oppose the interviews in principle,
in practice he worried that Arabs who had done nothing wrong
might fall victim to overzealous policing. Many of the men con-
tacted by the Justice Department for interviews apparently had
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similar concerns. ‘‘When they got these letters they freaked out,’’
one social service provider who spoke with several of the men
recalled. ‘‘They didn’t know what was going on and they [thought
police] were taking them to jail. And [they said], ‘I didn’t do an-
ything!’’’ Other Arabs worried that police might misinterpret
innocuous statements the interviewees made.
These fears focused on the risks posed by the interviews them-
selves, but the idea that Dearborn police would help the Justice
Department conduct them raised additional concerns. In particu-
lar, close collaboration between local police and federal agents
might instill everyday police-community interactions with sinister
undertones, as local Arabs wondered whether Dearborn officers
were passing information to federal agents. In the immediate af-
termath of the attacks, many members of Dearborn’s Arab com-
munity say they became suspicious of local police in this way. For
example, when asked how her views about local police changed
after 9/11, one Dearborn Arab explained, ‘‘I think there will always
be in the back of your head, like, ‘Oh, he could be working with the
FBI, this guy’.’’ Such suspicion infected the most mundane inter-
actions. For example, as part of the city’s increasing attention to
neighborhood government, the mayor’s office decided to begin
sending police officers to meetings for all the city’s neighborhood
associations in 2002. But when the city contacted the associations to
make arrangements, it aroused suspicion among some neighbor-
hood groups. One member of a group in a predominantly Arab
neighborhood explained:
You’re sending the police to homeowners meetings . . . And I
mentioned to [the mayor’s community liaison], ‘‘You’ve got to do
a little bit of communicating to people what the purpose of this is
because at a time like this, you get a call like that from City Hall’’
Fand I said, ‘‘What’s the purpose? I know people are going to be
asking me.’’ ‘‘Well, the mayor and the police chief want it.’’ Well,
why? Are they spying?
Such concerns were particularly salient after 9/11, as widespread
concerns that Arabs were under heightened suspicion had already
made many of them more reticent. For example, two Arab inter-
viewees reported that many local Arabs had begun to feel self-
conscious about expressing controversial political views (such as
their opinions about Palestine) in public places. In this context,
Dearborn police had good reason to distance themselves from
federal surveillance efforts, which threatened to stifle their rela-
tionship with local community members who already felt they were
being watched.
In contrast to the predominantly critical view of the interviews
in the community, police initially seemed inclined to support the
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effort. Some police did question whether the interviews would be
effective, and one viewed them as a resource drain for the DPD,
but none of those I spoke with suggested that Dearborn should not
have participated. In part, their support arose out of a sense of
patriotic duty. ‘‘You’ve got to help your country,’’ one DPD mem-
ber explained when asked why the DPD assisted the Justice De-
partment with the interviews, echoing the language of other police
officials. In part, the support arose out of a sense of shared law
enforcement mission with federal investigators. ‘‘The chief had no
problem with it at all,’’ another manager explained. ‘‘He’s an FBI
academy grad. He knows the process, he’s a street cop.’’ Most po-
lice and city officials did say that they understood and sympathized
with community concerns about the interviews, but many thought
those concerns were overdrawn, insisting that the interviews were
voluntary and nonthreatening and, therefore, a reasonable law
enforcement tactic. ‘‘They were concerned about profiling and
losing their rights,’’ one member of the DPD member recalled.
‘‘Which of course none of us would ever condone. But I mean
there’s still such a thing asFeverybody calls it things like racial
profiling . . . I call it criminal profiling. It’s so simple.’’ One Arab
American police officer explained:
They [local Arabs] didn’t like it. They thought, ‘‘Why them, why
them?’’ And I would tell them, ‘‘19 guys or whatever it was on the
planes. Well they weren’t 19 Mexicans. They weren’t 19 black
guys. They were of Middle Eastern descent. That’s the reason.
That’s the bottom line. You can do all the window dressing you
want. That’s the bottom line.’’ (interviewee’s emphasis)
A few months after the interviews ended, Mayor Guido publicly
questioned whether there was too much concern about profiling.
‘‘There is a fine line between safety and political correctness,’’ he
told a reporter. ‘‘Sometimes there’s an oversensitivity in terms of
profiling. We’re all learning what is the right way to do things’’
(Pierre 2002:A-3).
Despite their own views, police and other city officials were
aware that the interview project was controversial in the Arab
community. The controversy made their role in the interviews
problematic, since police officers continued to worry about their
precarious reputation in the Arab community. One police com-
mander described the conflict he felt when reporters asked him
about the interviews. ‘‘What can I say? I mean, I’m not going to say
that I’m not going to support our federal government. I’m not
going to say I’m going to take away the rights of the Arabic com-
munity.’’ In the end, Dearborn officials (unlike their counterparts
in cities such as Portland, Oregon) did decide to assist the Justice
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Department with the interviews, but community concerns visibly
affected the way the city participated.
In particular, while Dearborn police agreed to help federal
agents locate interviewees and accompany them as they conducted
interviews, they declined the U.S. Attorney’s request to conduct the
interviews themselves. Mayor Guido, who was directly involved in
the decision, explained it as follows:
Guido: We told them that we didn’t want to do the interviews.
Initially the local police were going to be the information-gath-
ering organization. And we said, ‘‘We will assist you, but we’re not
going to gather the information. We’re not going to ask the
questions. We’ll accompany you, we know how to get you where
you want to go, but once [you’re] there, you can do what you
need to do’’ [compare with Guido’s similar statements to the press
in Niemiec 2002].
Interviewer: Why was that?
Guido: Well, we spent years trying to establish trust and under-
standing with the Arab community. If we would have directly
participated in these interviews, having our officers going around
with big clipboards asking, ‘‘Where were you the night of Sep-
tember 11?’’ especially during times when it seemed as if all Arab
people and Muslims were under a cloud of suspicion, it would
have caused many years of work building these relationships to
go down the drain. This role wasn’t appropriate for us.
Several police officials echoed Guido’s views. So although local
police did participate in the interviews, they did so as supporting
partners, and they emphasized that fact by noting that the federal
government had spearheaded the effort. One DPD member ex-
plained, ‘‘[People asked me], are you for these interviews? I didn’t
start or initiate these interviews. The federal government initiated
them and we will assist them.’’
Community concerns about the interviews also led police to
think of themselves as something other than just assistants to the
federal agents. Local police did help federal agents locate inter-
viewees, and in some cases they served as translators because fed-
eral agencies had a shortage of Arabic speakers. But they also tried
to help reassure the interviewees and make their experiences as
nonthreatening as possible. City officials said they pursued these
goals in two ways.
First, during the interviews, Dearborn police viewed their role
partly in terms of monitoring federal agents to ensure they acted
professionally. ‘‘We were present if [the interviewees] had an issue
or problem,’’ Mayor Guido explained. Reflecting this idea, the of-
ficer who assisted federal agents with most of the interviews in
Dearborn explained that at the end of each one, he asked the
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interviewee whether he had found the questioning ‘‘offensive.’’ A
police manager elaborated on the DPD’s role:
I think [accompanying the federal agents] is a good thing to do
because at least we know what’s going on. You know, we know
how the federal government is treating these people. Because
we’ve got to deal with them on a day-to-day basis, the feds don’t.
So if we’re involved, at least we can have some input into what’s
going on. And if they [federal agents] do something stupid, you
know, we can say [laughing] ‘‘Hey, they did that’’ and try to focus
the attentionFthe negative attentionFon where it should be
focused. (interviewee’s emphasis)3
He went on to say that no such complaints arose, and the officers
who participated in the interviews concurred with that assessment.
‘‘You know they were very professional, the federal investigators,
and hopefully our officers were too,’’ the manager continued. ‘‘I
have not received any complaints about [the] officers, which is
good. Especially in this sensitive area like interviewing immigrants.
So I think it worked out well. It was a good idea to have the locals
involved.’’
Second, at a broader policy level, local police reported that they
worked with and reinforced the message of Arab leaders who had
formed a working group designed to urge Jeff Collins, the U.S.
Attorney for Eastern Michigan, to modify the Justice Department’s
plans in his district. The DPD had an important mechanism for
relaying those concerns because one of its officers served on the
local Anti-Terrorism Task Force, which had the authority to decide
how the interview plans would be implemented. A Justice Depart-
ment spokeswoman told reporters that the U.S. Attorney’s Office
welcomed such input from local police (Wilgoren 2001).
After several discussions, Collins agreed to a number of chang-
es, including sending letters before visiting the interviewees’
homes, arriving in plainclothes, and emphasizing the voluntary
nature of the interviews. The most significant change was the
method of contacting interviewees. At first federal agents planned
to contact the interviewees by knocking on their doors unan-
nounced, but Collins agreed to first mail letters asking each inter-
viewee to contact his office to schedule a meeting. The letters
stressed that ‘‘we have no reason to believe that you are, in any way,
associated with terrorist activities. Nevertheless . . . it is quite possible
that you have information that may seem irrelevant to you but
which may help us piece together this puzzle’’ (Letter from Jeffrey
Collins to prospective interviewees, November 26, 2001; emphasis
in original). Arab leaders hoped that by sending letters about the
3 The police chief in Fremont, California (which has one of the nation’s largest Afghan
populations), explained his department’s participation similarly (Herel & Hendricks 2001).
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interviews before federal agents knocked on anyone’s door, the
would-be interviewees would be less intimidated by the agents’
visits and have an opportunity to contact a lawyer before deciding
whether to cooperate. (ACCESS and the ADC reported referring
dozens of clients to lawyers for this purpose.) Collins seemed to
endorse these aims, explaining that the changes his office made to
its interview plans ‘‘represent a conscious decision by law enforce-
ment to initiate contact in a manner that is the least intrusive’’
(Schaefer 2001:A-1). In the end, Collins’s district made more con-
cessions to community concerns about the interviews than any
other district in the country, and its changes to the interview pro-
tocol eventually served as a model that other U.S. Attorneys cop-
ied.4 With these assurances, a number of local Arab institutionsF
including ACCESS and the bilingual Arab-American NewsFasked
those contacted to cooperate with the government during the in-
itial round of interviews. (Most withdrew their support, however,
when the Justice Department announced plans for a second round
of interviews with a larger group of immigrants in March 2002.)
Despite these steps by local police, many community leaders
remained critical of the DPD’s decision to participate in the inter-
views. Rumors reportedly began circulating that the DPD commu-
nity policing officer who assisted federal agents with the largest
number of interviews was deporting immigrants. At the same time,
these rumors eventually died down, and the officer reported no
change in his rapport with the community. In any case, the city’s
decision to assist federal agents with the interviews never became a
major source of tension between Dearborn police and local Arab
leaders. While some Arab residents continued to object to the in-
terviews, they directed disapproval mainly at the federal govern-
ment, not local police.
In the end, it is hard to gauge how well the city’s efforts to
attend to community concerns mitigated the damage the interviews
might cause to police-community relations, though it is clear that
community leaders appreciated the fact that police discussed the
initiative with them at length. The important point here is that
concerns about community trust did seem to influence the way the
city participated in the interviews, despite the police’s own incli-
nation to view the effort as a legitimate law enforcement tool. Local
police declined to conduct the interviews themselves, they went to
great lengths to explain their participation in a qualified way, and
4 These concessions did not apparently undermine the project’s investigative goals. At
the end of both rounds of interviews, the Eastern District of Michigan had completed 59%
of its interviews, placing it in the top quarter of all districts nationally despite its enormous
caseload. Among districts that interviewed more than 100 immigrants, the Eastern District
had the highest rate of completion in the nation (author’s calculations from U.S. GAO
2003: Appendix III). Close to half of the district’s interviews were reportedly in Dearborn.
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they ultimately adopted the role (at least in part) of monitors for
the federal agents and representatives of community concerns. In
that way, the role the DPD played in the Justice Department in-
terviews was shaped by the interest local police had in establishing
legitimate boundaries around the use of new surveillance and in-
formation-gathering efforts, which could otherwise undermine the
trust and support they had worked so hard to develop in the Arab
community.
Dearborn’s Office of Community Preparedness
Early in 2002, Dearborn announced that it would establish a
local Office of Homeland Security to spearhead its anti-terrorism
efforts. Organizationally, the office would be located in the police
department, and a police lieutenant would direct it. Its evolution
demonstrates how the three interests described separately so far
came together to shape the city’s main anti-terrorism initiative.
Community reaction to the announcement was mixed, as many
community leaders and media commentators questioned the city’s
reasons for establishing the office. ‘‘People . . . responded very
negatively to it,’’ one Arab leader in Dearborn explained. Another
concurred: ‘‘When the office of security homeland [sic] came out,
there were a lot of mixed feelings about it in the city . . . People
thought that you had to be careful.’’ In particular, this community
leader felt that the office’s name had overtones of a police state. ‘‘I
hate that word,’’ he explained. ‘‘‘Homeland’ to me sounds like Nazi
Germany.’’ Others worried the office would do more damage to
Dearborn’s reputation by sending the wrong message to the re-
gional and national audience that seemed to watch the city’s every
move. The ADC’s Imad Hamad expressed this concern succinctly
to a reporter at the time: ‘‘I don’t see that it’s needed,’’ he said of
the new office. ‘‘It might send the wrong signal . . . that a high
number of Arab-American people makes Dearborn a dangerous
community’’ (Niemiec 2002:B-1). He went on to suggest that the
announcement might reinforce the negative attention Dearborn
had been subjected to in the national media, and he indicated that
he did not want the city to apply for homeland security funds on
the grounds that it had a large Arab population (Niemiec 2002).
The city quickly responded to these concerns by renaming the
office. Instead of an office for homeland security, Dearborn would
establish an office for community preparedness. Community mem-
bers expressed approval for the change. ‘‘That’s a good sign,’’ one
commented, and another described the new name as ‘‘more pal-
atable.’’ One city official remembered the episode:
We got hung for that one. The federal government can call it
homeland security, the state can call it homeland security. Dear-
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born says, ‘‘OK, we’ve got a homeland security [office].’’ ‘‘Why?
Have you got terrorists in your town?’’ No, that’s not what we
said! . . . It was [just] a nice name because it was consistent with the
federal government and the state. And of course we quickly
changed that name to community preparedness coordinator just
so there wouldn’t be any more [criticism]. To quiet the . . . per-
ception that we had a terrorist problem in Dearborn. Because
that’s what everyone said, ‘‘You’re doing this because you must
have this problem.’’
Thus although police themselves had not initially recognized how a
new office of ‘‘homeland security’’ might exacerbate concerns
about the city’s reputation, they did not hesitate to rename it once
community members brought that concern to their attention.
Naming the office was only a symbolic act, but the city’s sym-
bolic statement that police would pursue ‘‘community prepared-
ness’’ rather than ‘‘homeland security’’ can serve as a metaphor for
the priorities the office has adopted. On that point, DPD command
staff, the mayor, and the coordinator of the new office all offered
similar accounts, insisting that the office was not designed to sup-
port new surveillance efforts focused on Dearborn residents but to
coordinate and extend existing community preparedness tasks. So
far, the makeup and operation of the office support that claim. For
example, in selecting the first community preparedness coordina-
tor, the police chief did not choose an investigator but a former
head of the training division who had extensive budgetary expe-
rience. That choice apparently reflected the view that one of the
role’s core responsibilities would be to apply for federal grants to
fund emergency response activities. Discussing the kind of grants
he plans to pursue, the coordinator focuses on resources that can
help the department cope with the aftermath of terrorist attacks.
For example, to illustrate the kind of activity he will try to secure
grant money for, the coordinator mentioned a regional consortium
of law enforcement agencies mobilized after a 1997 plane crash to
gather evidence and manage the crash scene. In this respect, the
coordinator views the city’s anti-terrorism needs in the same terms
as its needs for other kinds of disastersFan analogy that holds
for the community protection side of homeland security but not
offender search.
Other city officials echo this perspective. When asked which
homeland security activities he asked the new office to pursue,
Mayor Guido focused on first response: ‘‘For us emergency pre-
parednessFwhether it’s a tornado, a flood, or some sort of bomb-
ingFrequires that proper procedures be put in place. It’s all about
determining the best way to react in order to protect and save lives.
Whether it’s a tornado or a bombing, we need to be ready.’’ Guido
went on to emphasize functions such as the acquisition of technol-
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ogy to handle hazardous materials and the development of proto-
cols for handling bodies in large disasters (compare with his similar
account in Associated Press 2002). Once again, by comparing the
city’s role with regard to terrorism to its role with regard to natural
disasters, city officials place offender search activities outside the
scope of their homeland security efforts.
Other aspects of community protection round out the main
functions of the office. One of the coordinator’s duties is to inves-
tigate reports of hate crimes in the city, and he oversees efforts to
prevent hate crimes. He also has responsibility for organizing the
city’s response to terrorist threats. In particular, when the federal
government announces that it thinks the risk of an attack has risen,
those warnings are routed to the coordinator, who in turn commu-
nicates with the rest of the force to indicate how officers should
tighten up security. For example, when federal officials raised the
nation’s color-coded terrorist alert level during one holiday week-
end, the coordinator received the alert and distributed an an-
nouncement throughout the DPD indicating that officers should be
especially vigilant for unusual activity, such as suspicious cars parked
in city lots over the weekend. Finally, the coordinator follows up on
more specific threats when officers become aware of them. For ex-
ample, on the day I interviewed the coordinator, he had just finished
questioning a young Arab man who had allegedly made threats
against the police department during an argument with a business-
man. In this case, after talking with the young man and the business
owner, the coordinator concluded that if the man had made threat-
ening statements at all, they were probably idle. Asked to speculate
what he would have done if they had not been, the coordinator said
he would hand the case off to federal investigators. Thus local police
involvement in offender search is limited even when the investiga-
tion is reactive and even when Dearborn itself might be a target.
As important as what the community preparedness coordinator
does is what his office does not do. Throughout the evolution of the
community preparedness office, the city has emphasized that it will
not be engaged in proactive surveillance. City officials took this po-
sition early on, in the first of its regular meetings with Arab leaders
after a new homeland security office was announced. ‘‘‘Why are we
doing it?’’’ Mayor Guido remembered community leaders asking.
‘‘‘Because there’s a lot [of] Arabs in this city and they think there are
people in the Arab community that are [involved in terrorism]? Are
they here to spy on us?’’’ In response, Guido and other city officials
say they denied that the office would be involved in ‘‘spying,’’ and
that the new office only existed to coordinate the community pre-
paredness functions described so far. ‘‘I said, ‘We’re not here to spy
Fwe’re not in that business,’’’ Guido remembers. ‘‘The feds have
their own setups, the CIA and the FBI and all those people. Ours is
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to respond and to react and that’s what we’ve been doing.’’ When
asked specific questions about whether the DPD might proactively
investigate potential terrorist cells in the city, either on its own in-
itiative or in response to requests from the federal government, city
officials uniformly expressed doubts. ‘‘We’re not, you know, the
FBI,’’ one police manager explained.
And if they asked us to do that, we probably wouldn’t. . . . We want
to keep you safe, and we want to keep that level of protection up.
And we’re not going to stop doing what we’re doing to go do this.
If they want to do it they can do it. . . . That’s the next level, and
I’m not sure if we want to go to the next level. They’d have to
come in with some very, very tough evidence that they needed this,
that this was absolutely necessary, for us to stand up and do it. We
don’t want to violate that community-police relationship.
Several other city officials offered similar answers to this question,
indicating a widespread reluctance to have Dearborn officers en-
gage in offender search activities. A concern that such activities
would undermine community trust seems to animate this reluc-
tance, as the previous quotation indicates.
There is one major exception to this barrier against local in-
volvement in offender search efforts. Dearborn police have as-
signed one officer to the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force ( JTTF),
which draws membership from federal agencies (notably the FBI
and the INS) and local law enforcement. The main function of the
task force is to coordinate investigations of potential terrorist ac-
tivity in the region. For example, an investigation coordinated by
the task force led to the arrest of three former Dearborn residents
in Detroit in late September 2001. After 9/11, in its most significant
commitment of resources to offender search efforts to date, Dear-
born assigned one officer to the task force, and its community
preparedness coordinator attends many task force meetings.
As might be expected, the city approached this relationship
with trepidation. Mayor Guido, for example, emphasized the city’s
hands-off relationship with the officer who serves as their primary
liaison to the task force:
We do have people assigned to the task force, but they are not even
in our building and they don’t interact with our officers. They’re
there basically working with the federal government. And any of
that intelligence stuffFso and so might be here and this person is
thereFI don’t want to know about it. I want to be able to go up on
the avenue and have my lunch and smile at everybody. I don’t
want to be looking at anybody with suspicious eyes.
Indeed, for some time the community preparedness coordinator
did not have security clearance, so he was not privy to much of the
information received by the officer his department had assigned to
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the task forceFan officer who ostensibly reported to him. So the
city does contribute to proactive investigations of terrorism by as-
signing an officer to the federal JTTF, but the officer operates
under federal direction, and the city maintains considerable dis-
tance between him and the rest of city government, as if to insulate
itself from the contaminating effects of offender search activities.
That still leaves the question of why the city maintains any
relationship with the task force at all. No doubt one reason is the
sense of occupational purpose and national duty that played a role
in other offender search activities, such as the Justice Department
interviews. But involvement with the JTTF also has direct benefits
to the city, by both enhancing its capacity for community protection
andFparadoxicallyFminimizing its offender search responsibili-
ties. First, the relationship with the task force gives police access to
federal intelligence about possible terrorist attacks. As one police
manager explained, ‘‘They [the task force] can share information
with us knowing that if there’s something that’s going to happen, at
least we can prepare the department and the city.’’ Second, the
relationship relieves local police from the need to investigate ter-
rorist activity by establishing a simple channel they can use to pass
information to federal agents. If officers become aware of potential
terrorist threats, they can alert the JTTF and return to their reg-
ular duties. For example, when the young man mentioned above
allegedly made terrorist threats against police, Dearborn’s com-
munity preparedness coordinator explained that if the threats had
not turned out to be idle, he would have turned the matter over to
the JTTF rather than investigate the incident himself. In that re-
spect, the DPD’s relationship with the JTTF reduces rather than
expands its own responsibilities for investigating terrorist activity.
Dearborn’s Office of Community Preparedness is the city’s
central institutional vehicle for homeland security, and it bears the
imprint of the three concerns introduced earlier. After some initial
turmoil, city officials shied away from statements about the office
that might exacerbate negative perceptions of Dearborn. Moreo-
ver, because of concerns about ‘‘violating that police-community
relationship’’ and about the consequences of ‘‘looking at anybody
with suspicious eyes,’’ the office has shunned new offender search
activities, trying to pass them on to federal investigators. Finally,
city officials have placed special emphasis on the role the office will
play in emergency preparedness and protective security.
Discussion
The evolution of homeland security in Dearborn illustrates the
considerations that can steer local government away from offender
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search and toward community protection. Since local government is
mainly concerned with the well-being of a specific place, it has little
reason to bear the costs of new police activities unless the benefits to
the city itself are clear. For example, when Dearborn’s own safety
and vitality were at risk from the threat of hate crimes after 9/11,
local police quickly stepped up patrol around potential targets, and
they did so with strong community support. But absent specific
threats such as these, debates about offender search have focused
entirely on the damage it could do to the cityFin particular, damage
to its reputation and damage to the legitimacy of its police.
In these decisions where the interests of the city itself were at
stake (as opposed to the merely ‘‘allocational’’ decisions discussed
by Peterson), a wide range of local political actors quickly came to
rough agreement about the right course of action, and they ex-
erted influence when and because they helped advance the inter-
ests of the city as a whole (Peterson 1981:131–49, 167–83). In the
early response to the threat of hate crimes, there was no disagree-
ment among community leaders and city officials who attended the
city’s post-9/11 meetings. Even when police tried to discourage
public demonstrations that might draw negative attention to Dear-
born, Arab community leaders who might be expected to object
never did so. Police themselves did generate controversy when
they named their new anti-terrorism unit an ‘‘office of homeland
security’’ and offered initial support to offender search efforts. But
they backpedaled quickly and without any real resistance once
community leaders called attention to the damage these choices
could do to police legitimacy and Dearborn’s reputationFdespite
the fact that they had to act against their occupational ideals and
assumptions to do so (compare with Peterson et al. 1986:191–215).
Although the relevant policy issues, city interests, and political
actors differ, this deference by Dearborn officials to community
leaders resembles Peterson’s description of the politics that typify
‘‘developmental’’ policymaking. In that domain, Peterson conclud-
ed that city officials often work closely and consensually with busi-
ness leaders because they ‘‘are the people who are aware of the
factors that could help promote the community’s economic capac-
ity, and they possess sufficient financial and other resources to in-
fluence it’’ (1981:141). Similarly, the community leaders who
worked with the DPD are the sort of people who are aware of the
factors that enhance police legitimacy, and they possess sufficient
clout with the community and media to influence it. Those assets
position them well to help design and broadcast an ‘‘umbrella of
legitimacy’’ for police actions (Winship & Berrien 1999:54), as
Dearborn officials recognized. The city’s early decision to convene
regular meetings with Arab leaders and its repeated decisions to
respond quickly to concerns raised in them reflect an awareness
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that Arab leaders were in a better position than police themselves
to know how policy choices might affect police legitimacy and the
city’s reputation. That cooperation had special importance when
the DPD faced new questions about the unfamiliar issue of home-
land security. In such situations, community leaders’ expertise
about police legitimacy and city honor is particularly valuable be-
cause police must evaluate new uses for their authority, whose ef-
fects on community trust may not be clear. Other departments in
similar situations have also turned to community leaders for help
(Winship & Berrien 1999).
In these respects, Dearborn’s homeland security decisions il-
lustrate Peterson’s idea that the surface drama of local politics is
shaped by the interests of the city as a whole. Although local of-
fender search efforts may serve important national goals, any par-
ticular city has little reason to pursue them except in rare cases
when local political actors believe that suspected terrorists have
targeted their city; otherwise, offender search threatens to bring
nothing but damage to police legitimacy and the city’s reputation.
Stung by the crisis of police legitimacy in the 1990s, Dearborn city
officials recognized these risks, and they turned to Arab community
leaders for help.
Although the Dearborn case reflects Peterson’s basic ideas
about the role city interests play in local governance, it also chal-
lenges and extends his analysis by complicating the kinds of inter-
ests that cities have. Economic interests alone cannot explain (much
less justify) Dearborn’s homeland security decisions. To be sure, the
city’s emphasis on public safety may reflect its interest in economic
vitality. Some city officials explained their efforts to reassure Dear-
born’s Arab community that police would protect them from hate
crimes by citing concerns about falloff in local business activity; and
in fact, academic research supports the idea that public safety con-
tributes to economic vitality (DiIulio 1989; Cullen & Levitt 1999).
But if Dearborn’s interest in public safety can be accommodated
easily within Peterson’s economics-driven framework, the other
two interests that shaped Dearborn’s decisions cannot.
First, city officials’ response to insistent media coverage after
9/11 and their attention to the implicit messages conveyed by
Dearborn’s homeland security activities were driven not by con-
cerns about economic vitality but by a sense that the city’s honor
was at risk. City officials and residents alike expressed this concern
explicitly, and it clearly underlies both the message they tried to
convey to the media and the decision the city made to rename its
homeland security office. City officials had good reasons to worry
about honor and reputation in these ways, since immigrant groups
and the communities where they live often find their social stand-
ing thrown into question during times of international conflict
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(Higham 1988). Dearborn’s reputation was particularly vulnerable
because, as a historical matter, its public image had become tied to
its ethnic composition and its segregationist past.
Second, the city’s complicated response to the Justice Depart-
ment’s interview project and the mission it assigned to its Office of
Community Preparedness were shaped by a legitimate interest in
maintaining community trust, and thus in the fair and restrained
use of the surveillance and information-gathering it requires. Local
police sought to work with federal investigators to make sure the
interviews followed fair procedures (e.g., by contacting interview-
ees in advance so that they had a chance to seek legal counsel) and
that federal agents treated interviewees with respect, recognizing
that Dearborn’s Arab community might lose trust in local police
otherwise (compare with Tyler 2004). The DPD also tried to limit
new offender search activities of its own, fearing that stepped-up
surveillance could stifle unguarded expression and damage the
relationship police had developed with the Arab communityF
particularly at a time when Dearborn Arabs felt they were under a
‘‘cloud of suspicion,’’ in Guido’s words (compare with Nagel 1998).
Where street crime is concerned, these concerns about the costs of
surveillance and information-gathering must often give way to an
interest in community protection (Thacher 2001a). But in the case
of homeland security, where the benefits of offender search typ-
ically accrue to other jurisdictions, no city interest counterbalances
the burdens of police surveillance.
It might be objected that even if Dearborn’s interests in honor
and the legitimate use of authority were the proximate reasons it
emphasized community protection rather than offender search,
economic interests still drove that emphasis in some ultimate sense.
For example, concerns about the city’s honor may reflect deeper
concerns that a reputation for unpatriotic sentiments or intoler-
ance could damage the city’s business climate (Sharp 1999: 235).
Similarly, the city’s interest in police legitimacy may also ultimately
rest on its economic interests because legitimacy arguably promotes
crime control effectiveness and thus economic vitality.
This objection makes an important point, since Weber himself
acknowledged that interests in status and power are often inter-
twined with economic interests in modern societies (1978:932,
938). Nevertheless, Weber insisted that it remains useful to distin-
guish these interests conceptually, and good reasons support his
position. Most simply, although interests in class, status, and power
often reinforce one another, sometimes they conflict, and in those
cases social action will be incomprehensible if we only consider
economic interests (1978:212, 926, 932). More subtly, even when
institutions and practices serve instrumental purposes such as eco-
nomic growth in some ultimate sense, they may still bring into play
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new commitments to ideals that transcend their instrumental or-
igins (Selznick 1957). The best-known example is punishment.
Even if we create the institution of punishment for the utilitarian
purpose of crime control, nonutilitarian principles may regulate
the practice of punishment (Hart 1968). Similarly, even if police
legitimacy ultimately matters only because police cannot fight
crime effectively without it, police must still abide by independent
principles that define what makes the use of authority legitimate in
order to safeguard their legitimacy (Weber 1978:212–6; Tyler
2004). That may be why there is no evidence that concerns about
crime control effectiveness directly influenced the way city officials
thought about protecting community trust in the DPD. Instead,
police concerns about community trust were tied to their desire to
avoid a repeat of the crisis of legitimacy they experienced during
the 1990s, which brought extensive media criticism and a traumatic
federal investigation. In that respect, even if police legitimacy pro-
motes public safety and thus serves a city’s economic interests in
some ultimate sense, the ideal of fair and restrained use of au-
thority still plays an ineliminable role in local governance. The
same could be said about the interest in honor: even if a city only
wants to shore up its honor for economic reasons, it has to play by
the rules of the honor game to do so (Weber 1978:932–8; Walzer
1983a:249–80).
So although the objection I am considering makes the impor-
tant point that the city’s multiple interests are intertwined, each
one still defines a partly independent set of constraints on local
policy. Everyday politics cannot always live in the world of ultimate
considerations because the institutions and practices we create to
serve those ultimate considerations set in motion their own dis-
tinctive logics of action.
Conclusion
The Dearborn case illustrates how the evolution of American
legal institutions is shaped by the position they occupy in our fed-
eral system of government. It is easy to miss this fact by focusing
mainly on street-level efforts to control crime and disorder, as
much of the policing literature has done, since both the costs and
benefits of street crime tend to accrue to roughly the same places.5
By contrast, a national problem such as homeland security draws
attention to the way the limited powers and geographic respon-
sibilities of local government shape the local police role. The struc-
5 For an interesting normative analysis that is relevant to my argument here (in that it
supports police surveillance only when its benefits redound to the same people who bear its
costs) see Meares and Kahan (1999), particularly the discussion of ‘‘burden-sharing.’’
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tural position of local governments in a federalist system influences
their interests, their politics, and the decisions they have reason to
make about policing. To date, sociolegal literature has said little
about these issues. As noted at the outset of this article, literature
about the police role has largely emphasized the commitment of
police to particular functions rather than their commitment to the
well-being of particular places, and literature about the politics of
policing has not recognized how the positions political actors take
are shaped by the structural constraints of local government. By
bringing Peterson’s theory of local government to bear on policing,
it is possible to extend our understanding of police organizations to
recognize how these territorial commitments and structural con-
straints are relevant to their practice. Although this extension has
general importance for sociolegal theory about the policeFand
potentially for theory about other legal institutions located at the
local level as wellFit has special importance for understanding the
local role in homeland security.
This application of Peterson’s theory to policing also helps ex-
tend the theory itself because it reveals the influence of city inter-
ests that go beyond economic vitality. Because legal institutions
involve the projection of government’s coercive powers, not just its
expenditure of money, they implicate a city’s interests in its honor
and the legitimate use of authority. Those interests, which are likely
to be important in policy domains other than homeland security,6
have at least two implications for theories about local government.
First, a more complex account of city interests suggests the need
for a more complex account of political rationality: although local
governments may be rational actors (Peterson 1981), they often
need to rely on more complicated forms of rationality than the
means-end rationality of economic efficiencyFboth because they
must manage the conflicts among their multiple interests (Thacher
& Rein 2004) and because their noneconomic interests often re-
quire judgments about appropriateness rather than judgments
about consequences (March & Olsen 1989:160). Second, the im-
portance of honor and the legitimate use of authority in city pol-
icymaking has important implications for our understanding of
federalism because of the special characteristics those interests
have. If the city’s interests are primarily economic, there are limits
to the kinds of policies that local governments will finance, but there
are no limits in principle to the policies they will administer, since
higher levels of government can simply subsidize them. But if cities
have interests in honor and the legitimate use of authority, and if
6 Notably the ‘‘morality policies’’ Sharp (1999) analyzed, which often involve police
and other regulatory powers (pp. 1–3) and which may have implications for a city’s rep-
utation even when they do not (p. 235).
Thacher 671
honor and legitimacy cannot be bought, then there may be policies
that are more inexorably closed to local government. For example,
there may be no practical and ethical way to pay local governments
to pursue offender search efforts because honor and legitimacyF
the two goods in whose coin the major burdens of offender search
efforts are paidFlie on the far side of a blocked exchange (Walzer
1983a:97–103). In such blocked exchanges lie the limits of the
intergovernmental transfers approach to federalism.
In addition to its theoretical implications for the literatures
about policing and local government, this study has implications
for homeland security policy, since it sheds light on the obstacles
and opportunities federal policy makers should consider as they
turn to local police for help. Federal efforts to stimulate community
protection at the local level are likely to move forward with the
same enthusiasm that greeted many of the intergovernmental pro-
grams in the 1994 crime bill (Public Safety Partnership and Com-
munity Policing Act 1994), and they share that characteristic with
other intergovernmental programs that serve city interests (Peter-
son et al. 1986:81–112). If federal officials hope to enlist cooper-
ation from local governments for offender search, however, they
should recognize the strong reasons cities have to resist. To suc-
ceed, federal policy makers would need to create the kinds of de-
tailed regulations, monitoring efforts, incentives, and widespread
professionalization among key occupational groups that have
proved necessary for controversial intergovernmental programs
such as compensatory education, whose redistributive objectives
conflicted with city interests (Peterson et al. 1986:131–59, 170–8).
In short, such efforts would require fairly deep structural changes
in American government, and even then federal expectations
would probably need to be modest (Peterson et al. 1986: 191–215).
Consequently, the decentralized nature of American government
places sharp limits on the ability of national policy makers to mo-
bilize the great majority of the country’s police officers to serve
national goals. Those limits involve not just the different opera-
tional capabilities of federal versus local law enforcement (Geller &
Morris 1992:321) but also the different corporate interests that
motivate them. If policy makers and the public conclude that these
national goals have grown in importance relative to street crime,
they may find it easier to shift resources toward federal police
rather than try to reshape local policing.
As I noted at the outset, not only is Dearborn ‘‘just one case’’: it
is an especially extreme case in many ways, and its experiences are
unlikely to be replicated exactly in many other cities (though the
U.S. Conference of Mayors survey discussed earlier (2002) does
suggest that most other cities have emphasized the same aspects of
homeland security as Dearborn, and the refusal of cities such as
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Portland, Oregon to assist with the federal interview project sug-
gests that Dearborn’s wariness about offender search efforts is not
unique or even extreme). It seems particularly important to ex-
amine whether homeland security efforts evolve differently in cities
with smaller Arab American populations, where concerns about
honor and the legitimate use of surveillance and information-gath-
ering are likely to be less salient, and in cities perceived to be at
great risk of terrorist attack, where a larger share of the benefits of
offender search activities redound to the city itself. (It could be
especially instructive to investigate how local police define their
homeland security role in non-U.S. cities such as Jerusalem, where
terrorism is a constant threat in everyday life.) Moreover, from an
international perspective, it remains an open question whether the
limits on local policing described here only apply if the formal
structure of a federalist system is in place, since formally centralized
systems of policing often behave like decentralized systems (Bayley
1985:54). Nevertheless, despite the continuing need for future re-
search into questions such as these, the Dearborn case already
demonstrates that there are significant barriers to local govern-
ment involvement in offender search activities in precisely those
cities where U.S. homeland security policy makers would most like
to target their efforts.
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